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Abstract
The counter-intelligence service of the German Armed Forces High Command 
launched Operation Dora in 1941 to update terrain information of North Africa for 
the German warfare and to reconnoitre the frontier between Libya and Chad. This 
article presents Sonderkommando Dora as an example of military geoscientific 
reconnaissance during World War II in the North African theatre of war where the 
German Armed Forces needed more accurate military geographic information on 
the Western Desert. The scientific personnel comprised geographers, cartographers, 
geologists, astronomers, meteorologists and road specialists, and they prepared special 
maps on the environmental setting of the Libyan Sahara. As far as it is known, these 
special maps were never used by Axis troops (who fought in World War II against the 
Allies) for tactical purposes – although it cannot be ruled out that the maps provided 
general information on the proximity of the German Africa Corps, the Panzer Group 
Africa and of the Panzer Army Africa, respectively, and also of the retreating Army 
Group Africa.
Introduction
In January 1941, the counter-intelligence service of the German Armed Forces 
High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht [OKW]), commanded by Admiral 
Wilhelm Canaris, launched Operation Dora to update terrain information of North 
Africa for the German warfare and to reconnoitre the frontier between Libya and 
Chad. Sonderkommando Dora was headed by an air force colonel, and had company 
status. It consisted of a military group of about 100 personnel and a scientific unit 
of about 10 military geoscientists, such as geographers, cartographers, geologists, 
astronomers, meteorologists and road specialists. The military scientific teams were 
fully motorised and supported by airplanes for reconnaissance flights. The head of the 
military geoscientific staff was the geographer Dr Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel. 
In the base camp Hon, 500 km south-southeast of Tripoli, two reconnaissance 
teams were formed, Eastern Patrol and Western Patrol, each comprising 10 personnel, 
seven wheeled vehicles and airplanes. Eastern Patrol reconnoitred the routes east of 
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Djebel Haruj via Wau en Namus to Bir Bu Haschischa; Western Patrol reconnoitred 
part of Fezzan, from Murzuq in the east to Gatrun and Djebel ben Gnema. Both patrols 
provided cartographic maps of important routes crossing the Sahara in meridional 
direction at a scale of 1:200 000, including military geologic information on water 
supply, trafficability, natural obstacles and a map of magnetic deviation.
Morphologic-geologic maps were drawn based on the geologic mapping and 
reconnaissance flights, highlighting hamada (high rocky plateau, often with scarps), 
serir (gravel desert), ergs (areas of shifting sand dunes), dunes and oases. Oases 
were important for calculation of water supply, while mapping hamada, serir and 
dunes was important for calculating the off-road trafficability for armed forces. In 
total, Sonderkommando Dora provided 23 specialised maps at various scales, i.e. 
1:25 000, 1:50 000, 1:200 000 and 1:1 million. Whereas the accuracy of official 
Italian topographic maps could be off by tens of kilometres, post-war validation of 
these maps updated by Sonderkommando Dora using high-resolution satellite images 
yielded inaccuracies at a maximum of 500 metres.
Independent of this military scientific special command, a second German Special 
Forces unit, Dora was also launched in western Libya, to which the Brandenburg 
Regiment was attached.
Only few articles have been published on Sonderkommando Dora, its orders and 
reconnaissance in central Libya as well as the geoscientific results thereof. This is not 
surprising because special command Dora was launched in January 1941 by Abwehr-
Abteilung I, the Counter-Intelligence Branch I of the German Armed Forces High 
Command. The military geoscientific mission of Sonderkommando Dora in Libya 
lasted from April 1942 to January 1943.
In 1951, one of the staff members of Sonderkommando Dora, the astronomer Dr 
Nikolaus Benjamin Richter, published a civil version of his journey to the Sahara,1 
which was printed as second edition and commented on by Michael Rolke.2 Another 
expedition report was published by Richter in 1958, which was also reprinted and 
commented on as second edition by Michael Rolke,3  and many maps produced by 
this special command were published by him.4 Among others, scientific articles 
on geological observations during the 1942 mission of the special command were 
published by the geologists Dr Georg Knetsch and Dr Friedrich-Karl Mixius.5 Special 
geographic studies were performed by the cartographer Dr Wolfgang Pillewizer.6 
Based on personal contacts with staff members of the German special command and 
archive studies, the geoscientific results of Sonderkommando Dora were documented 
by Hermann Häusler and later on cited by Sören Flachowsky and Holger Stoecker. A 
geomedical monograph series of Libya was published by the geographer and medical 
doctor Helmuth Kanter in 1967.7 
Erwin Schmidl8 as well as Kuno Gross and others 9  briefly refer to the mission of 
Sonderkommando Dora, the results of which had been published by Hermann Häusler10 
and later on again by Wolfgang Kaufmann.11 In addition, Erwin Schmidl12 reported 
that locally and timely paralleling the military geoscientific Sonderkommando Dora, 
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a purely military special command was detached to Libya, consisting of teams of the 
Brandenburg Regiment. Several authors dealing with Special Forces of World War II 
refer to this Brandenburger mission, which has also been termed Sonderkommando 
D ora.13  In addition to these two special commands, both termed Sonderkommando 
Dora, a further special command of Rommel’s Afrika Korps to central Libya termed 
Unternehmen Dora14 is also reported. Because the Brandenburgers also supported the 
Panzerarmee Afrika in 1942 until the retreat following El Alamein,15 Kuno Gross and 
others concluded, “Till now not the slightest shred of evidence has been found to 
indicate that Unternehmen Dora really took place”, and some confusion of these Dora 
missions can be recognised on the Internet.16
The intention of this article is to present results of Sonderkommando Dora as 
an example of military geoscientific reconnaissance during World War II in North 
Africa. Firstly, the reasons why the Supreme High Command of the German Armed 
Forces needed more accurate military geographic information on the Western Desert, 
in particular on the border region between Chad and Libya, are explained. This is 
followed by a description of the environmental settings regarding physical geography, 
ecoregions, geology and hydrogeology of the operational area of Sonderkommando 
Dora. In the next two sections, personnel and equipment of this special command as 
well as the results of the military geoscientific reconnaissance in Libya are outlined. In 
the above-mentioned context of varying Dora commands, an organigram of missions 
in North Africa is presented and discussed in the next section.
Special missions of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed 
Forces in North Africa
Special missions of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht in North Africa are 
presented in a timeline of events that lasted from December 1940 to late 1942. On 10 
June 1940, Italy declared war on France and the United Kingdom and Italian colonial 
forces in Libya launched the invasion of Egypt. From December 1940 to February 
1941, British Empire forces attacked Italian forces in western Egypt and Cyrenaica 
during Operation Compass. On 22 January 1941, British troops occupied Tobruk, and 
on 9 February 1941, they occupied El Agheila. In January 1941, the oasis of Kufra 
was attacked by Free French from Equatorial Africa in concert with Long Range 
Desert Group patrols. 
Following a meeting between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini on 19 January 
1941, the German Afrika Korps was formed by the Supreme High Command of 
German Armed Forces under the command of Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel. On 
3 February 1941, Rommel was appointed head of the German Army troops in Africa. 
After arriving in Tripoli on 14 February, he reoccupied El Agheila on 24 February 
1941. When the Afrika Korps shipped to Libya, so did the Brandenburgers. The men, 
raised as four companies of special Tropical Units, were fluent in either English or 
Arabic and used captured British vehicles to operate behind enemy lines in raids and 
reconnaissance missions, mirroring the actions of the British Long Range Desert 
Group (LRDG).17
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Paralleling the advance of British troops in the Cyrenaica, in January 1941, 
Abteilung I of the Abwehr headquarters at the right time, the Foreign Intelligence 
Collection of the German counter-intelligence service (commanded by Colonel Hans 
Piekenbrock) launched Operation Theodora to update maps of North Africa for the 
German warfare and to reconnoitre the frontier between Libya and Chad (French 
Equatorial Africa). Major Franz Seubert headed Referat 2 of Army West (in charge of 
Near and Middle East as well as North Africa) and took charge of Operation Theodora, 
with the function of collecting information on the De Gaullist troops being massed 
under General Le Clerc in the Lake Chad area.18 In addition, Seubert was in charge 
of Operation Salam, Lázló Almásy’s successful infiltration of two German spies 
in a manner similar to the Allied LRDG.19  Theodora comprised the unit Theo (for 
theoretic), which had been deployed to a station of Abwehrstelle VI located at Rheda 
near Münster (Germany) since 1 August 1941. Like others, this Abwehrstelle at Rheda 
was also subdivided into sections for espionage, sabotage and counter-intelligence. 
The formation of an expedition team in Berlin was named Dora I and the special 
detachment sent to Libya in April 1942 was termed Dora II or Sonderkommando 
Dora, which took action in Libya until December 1942 (Figure 1). 
In January 1941, no military geography service was supporting higher commands 
with topographic maps because the Mapping and Survey Branch of the Army High 
Command was not launched before 1 November 1941.20 Hence, a meeting took place 
in Leipzig at the end of March 1941, where the following gentlemen agreed upon 
to support updating the French maps of North Africa and the Sahara for military 
purposes: 
 • Captain F Lumbeck, head of Abwehrstelle VI, the local station of German military 
intelligence in Münster (Westphalia); 
 • Dr R Reinhard, head of the Geographical Institute of Leipzig University; 
 • Dr Heinrich Schmitthenner, head of the Geographical Institute of Münster; 
 • Dr H Dörries, director of the Institute for Colonial Geography at the University 
of Leipzig and 
 • Dr Konrad Voppel, director in charge of the German Institute for Regional 
Studies.21 
Referring to Mr Dines-Jones, Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society in 
London, as cited by Gross and others,23  a March 1941 expedition to Gatrun in the 
south of Libya by Gruppe Schwerin was known to the British as Unternehmen 
Dora. This mission was conducted at a distance of 2 000 km by Gerhard Graf von 
Schwerin, who headed Special Purposes Regiment No. 200 of the 5th Light Division 
as a reconnaissance mission for the German Afrika Korps.24 Later on, in April 
1941, Gerhard von Schwerin led a long-range joint German and Italian commando 
force deep into the British Empire’s lines in Libya to recapture the Mechili. This 
Unternehmen Dora of Rommel’s 5th Light Division in the Fezzan was basically a 
mission of the Army High Command, paralleling the preparation of the geoscientific 
mission of Sonderkommando Dora launched by the Foreign Intelligence Departments 
of Amt Ausland Abwehr at the right time. 
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Figure 1: Tentative organigram of Operation Dora of Special Purposes Regiment 
200 in the Fezzan and of Operation Theodora in 1941, the predecessor of 
Sonderkommando Dora in the chain of command of the Supreme High Command of 
the Armed Forces in January 1942 (modified later22).
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Figure 1 is a tentative organigram of the special missions in North Africa, first 
planned by the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces on 26 January 1941 
(Theodora), followed by the expedition of the 5th Light Division (Unternehmen Dora) 
at the right time. When Operation Theodora ended after 10 months of intensive 
studies and preparation, in January 1942, Counter-Intelligence Abteilung I launched 
Sonderkommando Dora, the military geoscientific operation between Hon and the 
Tibesti massif, which is explained below. 
According to a secret order of the German counter-intelligence service dated 
27 March 1942, Abteilung I launched Sonderkommando Dora for which Foreign 
Intelligence Collection, Army West, was responsible.25 Sonderkommando Dora was a 
joint mission of the German armed forces and the air force, and received orders from 
several high commands, explicitly from –
 • the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces; 
 • the Army High Command; 
 • the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; 
 • Panzerarmee Afrika; and 
 • the Commander-in-Chief in the South, who was basically subordinate to the 
Italian High Command (Comando Supremo). 
Consequently, 24 offices were involved, including, amongst others, the central division 
of Wilhelm Canaris, the counter-intelligence branches Abwehr I, II and III as well as 
the local counter-intelligence stations Abwehrstelle III (Berlin) and VI (Münster).
It took ten months of preparation to set up Sonderkommando Dora as a mixed 
command. Its objective was to secure missing military information from areas of 
southern Libya that were not controlled by the Axis Forces, and to prepare a strong 
point at the southern Libyan border. The following comprises a list of orders given by 
various administrative departments:
-- Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, Operation’s Staff: Creation of 
missing information for potential expedition-like operations in Central Africa and 
Sudan. Reconnaissance of possible bases for offences and defeat in the southern 
hills of the Sahara. 
-- Foreign Intelligence Group: Military reconnaissance and counter-intelligence of 
areas not controlled by the German–Italian troops or Italian security organs, in 
particular regarding the influence of British and Free French forces in Equatorial 
Africa. Counter-espionage (according to procedures of Abwehr-Abteilung III 
F, responsible for foreign counter-espionage) comprising reconnaissance and 
control of enemy intelligence services east and south of the Panzerarmee Afrika 
as well as rearward of it.
-- Army High Command: Obtaining missing special military geographic 
information, such as aerial photo maps, route maps and trafficability maps based 
on photogrammetric and geodetic survey. Creating a special military geology 
water supply map of the Middle Sahara.
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-- Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe: Obtaining missing aerial geographic, 
navigatory and meteorological information for a potential service of the air force 
in Inner Africa. Gaining tropical medical and troop hygienic experiences for 
future operations in tropical Africa. 
Upon request of the Operations Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, 
Abteilung I of the German counter-intelligence service specified in a letter dated 2 
April 194226 that the Sonderkommando Dora should comprise three units, termed 
Groups a–c:27
Group a) This unit for military reconnaissance and counter-intelligence was 
based in Hon and was ordered to collect – with a network of foreign agents and 
in accordance and cooperation with Groups b and c – intelligence on British and 
Free French troops in Inner Africa. 
Group b) This unit for aerial reconnaissance and aerial stereo photo interpretation 
had to provide aerial photos and reconnoitre the area between Djebel Sauda and 
the Tibesti Massif, south of Hon. If needed, Group b had to support Group c, the 
military geoscientific group. 
Group c) This unit had to collect military geography and military geology 
information as well as navigation information about the area between Djebel 
Sauda and the Tibesti. Group c was protected by a military command equipped 
with a light armoured reconnaissance vehicle.28 
Sonderkommando Dora was commanded by Colonel Herbert Haeckel (at that time 
with Abwehr I, Referat 2) who later on also headed Group c in Libya. Because Group 
a of Sonderkommando Dora, responsible for military reconnaissance and counter-
intelligence, was ordered to obtain counter-intelligence using a network of foreign 
agents, it can be concluded that Abwehr-Abteilung II (headed by Colonel Erwin 
Lahousen-Vivremont) was also involved in this counter-espionage mission in south-
western Libya. It can only be assumed that, comparable to the March 1941 mission of 
Unternehmen Dora launched by the Regiment 200 z.b.V. (Gruppe Schwerin), another 
Unternehmen Dora was launched by Lieutenant Colonel Conrad von Leipzig in 
June 1942.29  Because the Brandenburg Regiment was attached to Abteilung II of the 
Abwehr, confusion arose in post-war literature about whether the counter-espionage 
mission in June 1942 was a mission performed by Group a of Sonderkommando Dora 
or a completely different mission of Abwehr II (also termed ‘Unternehmen Dora’). 
Without providing any references, several authors describe in detail the deployment 
of 100 personnel of Brandenburg Regiment z.b.V. 800 in North Africa as another 
Unternehmen Dora launched by Abwehr II in June 1942.3 0 Up to now, this operation 
has been proved neither by interrogation protocols3 1 nor by archival documents on the 
activities of the Amt Ausland Abwehr in North Africa and therefore several historians 
doubt the existence of this operation.3 2
To sum up: it is more likely that activities of the Free French and LRDG in the 
proximity of Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika increased in 1942 so that Group a of 
Sonderkommando Dora was reinforced by Brandenburgers for counter-intelligence 
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and sabotage. In such a case, the entire Sonderkommando Dora would have remained 
an operation of Abwehr-Abteilung I. It is this variant, though questionable, which is 
favoured in Figure 1.
In late 1941, the Military Geography Service of the Army General Staff printed a 
special pamphlet on Tunisia including landscape photographs and maps as well as a 
brief military evaluation of the different landscapes.3 3  However, similar information 
on Libya and the environmental settings of the Western Desert has not been prepared 
by the Military Geography Service.
Environmental settings of the Libyan Sahara
An introduction to the geology, landscape and climate of Libya is presented as far 
as is relevant for understanding military geology of the North African theatre of war.
The short description of Libyan climate follows the explanations of the German 
geographer Dr Helmuth Kanter, who took part in the counter-intelligence campaign 
of the German Abwehr in Libya.3 4 Its climate is determined by the contrast between 
the Mediterranean and the Sahara. Climatic regions depend on the distance to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Along the coastal and hilly regions of northern Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica Mediterranean coastal climate, coastal steppe climate and highland climate 
prevail with precipitation ranging from 100 to 400 mm/year. At a distance of ~300 km 
to the south continental steppe climate (with ~50-100 mm precipitation per year) is 
followed by semi-desert climate with less than ~20 mm/year. Desert climate prevails 
in central and southern Libya, and south-eastern Libya is influenced by extreme desert 
climate with precipitation less than 5 mm/year. As a consequence, Libya is poor in 
water. It periodically receives rain in winter which falls largely in coastal areas and 
only irregularly reaches the interior. Nevertheless temporary springs or autumn floods 
can suddenly fill dry river beds (wadis) causing accidents.
In terms of geology Libya belongs entirely to the Saharan domain forming 
the northern part of the African Shield. Precambrian outcrops are rare in Libya. 
Sedimentation continued from the Cambrian Period throughout the Palaeozoic Era, 
but epirogenetic movements occurred from the beginning of the Ordovician Period. 
Subsidence continued during the Jurassic Period. In the Murzuq and Kufra Basins, 
Mesozoic continental sedimentation (of Nubian Sandstone, marl and gypsum) 
persisted until the Early Cretaceous.3 5 At the end of the Early Cretaceous, the Libyan 
tilt began. Existing basins became stable, while sinking occurred in the eastern part 
of the country, which became subsidised. The subsidence is irregular, according to 
different blocks of varying mobility. The transgression of the Tertiary sea from the 
eastern Mediterranean reached the Tibesti region in Early Eocene. The Oligocene is 
characterised by the formation of rifts in conjunction with the strains stretching the 
African block. The stratigraphic history of the northern Cyrenaica is linked to the 
unstable Tunisian platforms. Uplifting of this zone took place during the Eocene, and 
it became intensively folded during the Middle Miocene. The present margins of the 
Gulf of Sirte correspond to east-southeast-trending Pliocene flexures, followed by \
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Figure 2: Detail of the geologic block diagram of Libya depicting a major dry valley 
south of the Big Sirte, the tectonic Djofra Graben structure. The widespread young 
basaltic layer of Jebel Sauda and Jebel Haruj es Sauda unconformably overlies elder 
deposits. View in southern direction. Abbreviation of geologic formations: OKr 
= Late Cretaceous, Nb = Nubian Formation, ME = Middle Eocene, ObE = Late 
E ocene.3 6 (Courtesy of German Geological Society).
Quaternary flexures in the same direction. Important volcanic activity occurred at 
the end of the Tertiary until Recent times and some faults still show seismic activity.
The explanations of subsurface geology and tectonics relevant for military geology 
follow the observations of the German geologists Georg Knetsch and Friedrich-Karl 
Mixius, who took part in the counter-intelligence campaign of the German Abwehr 
in Libya.3 7 The subsurface of the Libyan Sahara consists of openly folded and faulted 
marl and limestone of Cretaceous to Tertiary age. Weathering of clay stone and 
marlstone under desert conditions rapidly forms powdery soils, which are mostly 
cemented and therefore protected by a hard layer. Sand is not abundant in the central 
Sahara. However, huge dune complexes were formed toward Egypt (Great Sand 
Sea) and in the southwest of Libya, such as Idehan Murzuq and Ubari Hamada (high 
rocky plateau, often with scarps), serir (gravel desert), and occasionally graret, large 
depressions with several dm-thick powdery soil cemented by a thin layer of coarse 
sand or salt (fesh-fesh) prevail in the central Sahara. Sebakha, depressions filled with 
fine sand and enriched with salt, occur in addition to single dunes and larger dune 
complexes. These saltpans are either terminal lakes occasionally charged by flowing 
water or owe their existence to groundwater evaporation through capillary ascent.
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Figure 3: Map of the reconnaissance routes of Sonderkommando Dora in 1942. 
Route of Technical Reconnaissance Group East, east of Jebel Haruj es Sauda, and 
route of Technical Reconnaissance Group West, west of Haruj (modified later3 8). 
As a consequence of the young tectonic flexures of the northern Cyrenaica, the 
formations were tilted slightly northward, paralleling the coast, and a new water 
divide came into existence in an east-southeast direction. Whereas terraces and fluvial 
deposits indicate former cycles of erosion and sedimentation, a younger generation of 
dry valleys pronounces the morphological tilt of the northern Cyrenaica. 
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The importance of the knowledge of the groundwater situation of the central 
Sahara is threefold: first for the former colonial economy; second for knowledge on 
climate change during the last 10 000 years; and third for local water supply in the 
desert.3 9  Local occurrence of deep thermal groundwater is related to young volcanism 
and southeast-trending faults and graben structures, such as hot springs of the Djofra 
Graben near Djebel el Sauda or at the Wau an Namus volcano. The widespread first 
groundwater horizon (aquifer), which is close to the subsurface, is the most important 
aquifer for potable water supply. It supplies the oases, where marginal lakes of the 
dune complexes are charged from occasional precipitation along wadis. Using radar 
satellite images, it is now possible to identify channels of former meandering rivers, 
which today are overlain by meters to tens of meters of sand. Groundwater below sand 
dunes is best protected against evaporation. Groundwater of this first (upper) aquifer 
is on the one hand charged from precipitation in the higher mountains such as the up 
to 3 000 m high faulted Nubian Sandstone (overlying the crystalline basement) Tibesti 
Mountains in the south, and on the other hand by fossil groundwater from greater 
depths (artesian waters).
Landscape units, which were mapped by the geologists of  the Sonderkommando 
Dora in their route maps at a scale of 1:200 000 included hamada (high rocky plateau, 
often with scarps), serir (gravel desert), graret (depression, basin), sebakha (salty 
marsh, bog), fesh-fesh (soft powdery chalk or clay), ergs (idehan; areas of shifting 
sand dunes) and dunes. Airborne and field excursions in the Fezzan, between Idehan 
Ubari and Idehan Murzuq, revealed an east-west-trending plateau, the Hamada of 
Murzuq, followed up eastward by a serir. Between Hon in the northwest and the 
Djebel Eghei in the southeast, basaltic rocks filled the prominent southeast-trending 
tectonic graben, which formed the hills and rocky plateaus of Jebel Sauda, Jebel 
Haruj es Sauda, Wau en Namus and Jebel Eghei. The sand and gravel plain of Serir 
Kalancho borders Jebel Haruj es Sauda to the east (Figure 3).
Sonderkommando Dora
Due to these geographical conditions, the 100-person strong Group c reconnais-
sance company under the command of Dr Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel was divided into 
two patrol teams (Technical Group East and Technical Group West). These two teams 
were active from May–December 1942 and were ordered to perform cartographic 
mapping of expedition routes at a 1:200 000 scale, providing military geology maps 
including description of natural obstacles, water supply and the description of traffi-
cability, and concluding major through lines (Figure 3).
Sonderkommando Dora was commanded by Air Force Colonel Herbert Haeckel 
and had company status. It consisted of a military group of about 100 personnel and a 
scientific unit of about 10 military geoscientists, including geographers, cartographers, 
geologists, astronomers, meteorologists and road specialists. The main mission of this 
command was a military geoscientific one, and, although the command was fit for 
action, combats had to be avoided at all circumstances. The military scientific teams 
were fully motorised and supported by airplanes for reconnaissance flights.40 
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Sonderkommando Dora’s equipment consisted of 25 trucks and cars including 
15 Volkswagens (VW) with broad (balloon) tires, two light armoured scout cars, and 
airplanes such as one (armoured) Heinkel He 111, one Henschel 126, two “Weihen”, 
one Fieseler Fi 156 Stork (“Fieseler Storch”), several gliders and a big two-propeller 
aircraft. Their armaments consisted of only two light guns of the armoured scout cars 
and infantry weapons such as MG 34 machine guns, rifles, submachine guns and 
pistols. In accordance with Italian High Command, Sonderkommando Dora had its 
logistic support camp at Hon, 500 km south-southeast of Tripoli. The Hon airport 
Radio station had contact with Berlin headquarters as well as with smaller radio 
stations of Sonderkommando Dora’s technical teams. The commanding officer and 
geographer Dr Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel, a reserve lieutenant of the German Air 
Force, was also the head of the military geoscientific staff.41
Many of the geoscientific staff had no military ranks and were therefore termed 
‘Sonderführer’, which was a civil rank somehow equivalent to an officer. All were 
trained in the use of pistols, rifles and machine guns. These scientific personnel of 
Sonderkommando Dora were deployed into two technical groups, Technical Group 
East and Technical Group West, and consisted of the following persons:
 - Lieutenant Dr Ing. Walter A Brucklacher (pilot and aerial photo interpreter of the 
ZEISS company);
 - Dr Rudolf Fritsch (zoologist and aerial photo interpreter);
 - Dr Alfons Gabriel (geographer and medical doctor);
 - Sonderführer Dr Fritz Höhndorf (meteorologist);
 - Captain Prof. Dr Helmuth Kanter (geographer and medical doctor);
 - Sonderführer Dr Georg Knetsch (geologist);
 - Sonderführer Dr Walter Knörlein (road construction from VW company);
 - Non-commissioned officer Dr Friedrich Karl Mixius (geologist);
 - Private Dr Wolfgang Pillewizer (topographer and cartographer);
 - Sonderführer Dr Nikolaus Benjamin Richter (astronomer, routes);
 - Lance corporal E Teichgräber (astronomer);
 - Lieutenant Dr Hans Rhotert (ethnologist, archaeologist, Sahara expert and 
navigator);
 - Lieutenant Dr Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel (geographer and zoologist); and
 - Dr Ludwig GA Zöhrer (zoologist).42
Two pilots of this group, Lance Corporal Drevermann and Lieutenant Dr Frowein, 
were experts for gliders. Three photographers were responsible for processing aerial 
photographs and three draughtsmen designed the route maps. A few personnel served 
both the military group as well as the scientific group, such as the geographer and 
medical doctor, Dr Alfons Gabriel, and the ethnologist, archaeologist and navigator, 
Lieutenant Dr Hans Rhotert.
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When Sonderkommando Dora’s mission in Libya ended and the teams returned 
to Germany in January 1943, this command was not closed down but functioned as 
an administrative headquarters with battalion status with Major Dr Fritz Gericke in 
command. From April 1943 to the end of the war, the (former African) research group 
was termed ‘Forschungsstaffel z.b.V.’, again headed by Dr Otto Schulz-Kampfhenkel. 
The abbreviation ‘z.b.V.’ was short for “zur besonderen Verwendung” meaning for the 
special use of high military commands or for special duty. Detailed information on the 
use of the Forschungsstaffel z.b.V. in the European theatres is available on demand 
from  the author.43  
Reconnaissance in Libya 1942
The aim of Sonderkommando Dora was to reconnoitre central and southern Libya 
from Jebel Sauda near Hon in the north to Jebel el Dora in the south. For this purpose, 
two reconnaissance teams were formed, Eastern Patrol and Western Patrol, each 
comprising ten persons, seven wheeled vehicles and airplanes. The Eastern Patrol 
reconnoitred the routes east of Jebel Haruj es Sauda via Wau en Namus to Bir Bu 
Haschischa; the Western Patrol reconnoitred the Fezzan, from Murzuq to Gatrun and 
Jebel Ben Gnema (Figure 3). Both patrols had to:
-- produce cartographic maps of all important routes crossing the Sahara at a scale 
of 1:200 000;
-- map military geology information on water supply, trafficability and natural 
obstacles, such as dunes and hilly areas (hamada); and
-- produce a map of magnetic deviation.44
The expedition routes southeast of Hon, located north of Jebel Sauda, comprised 
Fezzan west of Murzuq, Jebel Haruj es Sauda and extended to the Tibesti Massif 
(Tibesti Mountains) in the south. Topographic mapping was based on astronomic 
measurements, geodetic measurements, route sketches and mapping of the landscape 
along the routes. In the Murzuq Basin, four sheets at a scale of 1:200 000 were 
compiled. Based on geologic mapping and reconnaissance flights, a morphologic-
geologic overview map at a scale of 1:1 000 000 was designed, depicting hamada 
(stony plain), serir (gravel desert), dunes and oases. Oases were important for the 
calculation of water supply and condition of hamada, while serir and dunes were 
important for the calculation of off-road trafficability of armed forces.
The routes along the serir between Jebel el Sauda in the north and Wau el 
Kebir in the south were mapped by the Technische Gruppe, Erkundung West in six 
sheets at a scale of 1:200 000, which were compiled at a scale of 1:1 million and 
identified serir, dunes and oases. Similarly, the routes around the hilly hamada of 
Jebel Haruj es Sauda were mapped in nine sheets at a scale of 1:200 000, which 
were compiled at a 1:1 000 000 scale, identifying hamada, serir, dunes and oases. In 
total, Sonderkommando Dora provided two maps at a 1:25 000 scale, one map at a 
1:50 000 scale, 20 maps at a 1:200 000 scale and three overview maps at a scale of 
1:1 million from March to June 1942, i.e. within only four months.45
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Figure 4: Oblique aerial photo of Wau en Namus (above), the geodetic survey of it in 
1942 (middle)46 and a geologic block diagram of the volcano and its crater (below).47 
Note: meaning of German explanations: Schlammstrom (mud flow), Salzkrater 
(salt crater), Kristallin (crystalline basement), Nub. Sandst. (Nubian Sandstone), 
Kalk und Mergel, Salz (limestone and marl, salt), Grundwasser (ground water), 
Aschenschleier (thin cover of volcanic ash) (Courtesy of German Geological 
Society).
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Figure 5: Above: Good going on hard sand of the Serir Kalancho, east of Jebel Haruj 
es Sauda (1942).49  (Courtesy of Michal Farin, Belleville Publishers). Below: Bad 
going on soft sand.50 
A major result of the six-week military geoscientific reconnaissance in central and 
southern Libyan Sahara was cartographic maps of important routes at a scale of 1:200 
000, including details on trafficability, potential through routes, natural obstacles, such 
as dunes and hamada, maps of potential water supply, maps of magnetic deviation, 
and reports.48 
Figures 5 and 6 show examples of trafficability experienced by the technical 
groups of Sonderkommando Dora. Figure 5 (above) depicts wind-blown hard sand in 
the Serir Kalancho, north of Kufra Oasis, which is firm and allows good going versus 
the common situation when vehicles get stuck in soft sand (Figure 5, above).  
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Figure 6: Above: Bad trafficability of the marly dust plain northeast of Wau en 
Namus (10 July 1942). Below: Bad trafficability in the Black Haruj, which is a 
lava-stone desert covered by basalt blocks (13–16 July 1942).51 (Courtesy of Michal 
Farin, Belleville Publishers).
Figure 6 depicts two examples of bad going depending on the subsurface geology. 
Due to the dry climatic conditions, the marls of Late Cretaceous to Tertiary Age turn 
to marly dust that is hardly passable (above). The deeply incised volcanic hills of Jebel 
Sauda (south of Hon) and the Jebel Haruj es Sauda consist of boulders of disintegrated 
basaltic lava streams, which can hardly be passed by vehicles (Figure 6, below). The 
map in Figure 7 is an interpreted geologic map at a 1:1 million scale and was the basis 
for the field work within topographic sheets at a scale of 1:200 000. 
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Figure 7: Classification of landscape resulting in a general overview on trafficability 
based on the rock formations depicted in a geologic map that was evaluated by field 
expeditions and reconnaissance flights.52
Serir can be described in general as a plateau-like gravel desert without any 
obstacles; hence, it allows for good going. Dunes can either be passed at high speed or 
could cause delays by detours and/or local patches of soft sand (Figure 5). Hamada, 
in general, forms high rocky plateaus, often with scarps, where reconnaissance is 
essential before movement. This is particularly the case when it consists of basalt 
deposits, the lava flows of which disintegrate and turn to a landscape consisting of 
weathered gravel and boulders. Along the widespread occurrence of Late Cretaceous 
to Tertiary, formations of deeply weathered marls caused problems with trafficability 
(Figure 6).
Conclusions
In 1941, at a time when the Italian topographic maps were not accurate enough for 
assessing routes from Chad to Libya, Sonderkommando Dora substantially enhanced 
topographic maps at various scales and prepared special military geoscientific maps 
of this border area to assist the German Armed Forces High Command in decision-
making. As far as is known, these special maps were never used by Axis troops for 
tactical purposes – although it cannot be ruled out that the maps provided general 
information on the proximity of the German Africa Corps, the Panzer Group Africa 
and of the Panzer Army Africa, respectively, and also of the retreating Army Group 
Africa.
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